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ABSTRACT 
Self-employment  rates  and  incomes  differ  significantly  by race.  We show 
that these differentials  arise in  markets with  consumer discrimination  and 
incomplete  information  about the price of the good and the race of  the seller. 
Equilibrium  income distributions have two properties:  mean  black  incomes are 
lower than  mean  white  incomes, and the returns to  ability are lower for black 
than  for white sellers.  Able  blacks, therefore, are less likely  to self- 
select  into the self-employment  sector than able whites.  Using the 1980 
Census data, we find that observed differences  in the self-employment  income 
distributions  are consistent  with the theoretical predictions. 
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After a long period  of neglect, economists  have recently begun  to 
systematically  analyze  the role that self-employment  plays  in the labor 
market.  This  developing  literature  has already established  a few 
interesting  empirical  regularities regarding  the determinants  of self- 
employment  rates and the compensation of  self-employed  persons.  For 
example,  Blau (1987) finds  that changes in  tax laws and technology  account 
for a large  fraction of  the observed increase in  self-employment  rates over 
the last two decades; Lazear  and  Moore  (1984) document  that the age/earnings 
profiles  of  self-employed  persons are substantially  flatter than  the 
age/earnings  profiles  of salaried workers; and Evans  and Leighton  (1987) 
show  that the transition  rates into and Out of self-employment  are 
independent  of age and labor market  experience. 
It is also  well  known (Moore 1983; 8orjas 1986)  that there exist 
sizable  differences  in  the characteristics  of the self-employment  sector 
across  ethnic/racial  groups.  In  particular, whites  have larger self- 
employment  rates and incomes than blacks or  Hispanics.  This fact is hard to 
interpret  in the traditional  framework of an  employer  discrimination  model 
since  self-employed  persons have no reason to  discriminate  against 
themselves.1  This paper  presents a theoretical and empirical analysis  of 
the differences  in both self-employment  rates and incomes across  racial 
groups.  Our maintained  hypothesis  is thatthese differences  are generated 
by consumer  discrimination,  whereby white consumers  dislike purchasing  goods 
and services  from  blacks  and other minorities  (becker 1971). 
The simplest consumer  discrimination  model  assumes perfect  information 
(i.e.,  consumers  costlessly  know the price of the good  and the race of the 
sellers)  and generates  an  equilibrium  of complete segregation  (Cain 1986). -2- 
Racial  differences  in  self-employment  rates and incomes  in this model can 
only  be created by  differences  across  black and  white  consumers  and/or 
sellers.  In particular, black  and  white  consumers have to  differ in  their 
preferences  for goods or incomes, or there must be racial variation  in 
endowments  (of skills or  wealth)  of  sellers.  The theoretical  analysis, 
therefore,  then  depends on a number  of  extraneous  assumptions  about 
heterogeneity  between  the black and white populations.2 
A more powerful  analysis results  if consumers  can only  obtain  information 
about the price  of the good  and the race of the seller at a cost.  The 
existence  of imperfect  information yields  two important implications  about 
the population  income distributions  of  self-employed  blacks  and whites. 
First,  the mean income level of blacks  will  be smaller than  that of whites 
due to consumer  discrimination.  Second, the relative gains  of  entering  the 
self-employment  sector are reduced for able blacks.  Intuitively, high 
ability  self-employed  blacks  are more  likely  to expand  the scale of  their 
firm  and cater  to  the larger white  market.  This expansion,  however,  requires 
that high ability blacks  lower  their prices in  order to "compensate' white 
consumers  for their disutility.  Our empirical  analysis uses the 1980 U.S. 
Census  and shows  that indeed  blacks  and other minorities  are negatively 
selected  into self-employment,  but that  whites  are not.3 
Section  II presents  a search  model with consumer discrimination  that 
generates  equilibrium  price  and income  distributions  for white and black 
sellers.  This model  implies that skill wage  differentials  will  be narrower 
in  the self-employed  sector  for blacks  than  for whites.  The empirical 
implications  of the theory  are tested in  Section III.  Our analysis 
documents  a fundamental  difference  between  whites  and other  racial groups in 
the self-selection  mechanism  that generates  the pooi of  self-employed workers.  Finally,  Section  IV  summarizes  the results of the study. 
II.  Theory 
A.  Consumer 8ehav..ir 
Suppose  there are two types of  sellers, black (b)  and white  (w), 
producing  a homogeneous  good.  The fraction of black  sellers  in  the 
population  is  8, where  8 is assumed to  be less than one-half  throughout 
the analysis.  There  are also black and white buyers,  and, for simplicity, 
we assume  that the fraction  of  black buyers  in the population  is also given 
by  Finally, we assume  that all consumers maximize  utility,  are risk- 
neutral,  have a zero discount  rate, and an  infinite  time horizon. 
In order  to focus on the essential aspects of  consumer  discrimination, 
we assume  that white  consumers  have a taste for discrimination  against black 
sellers,  but that black  buyers  are indifferent  about the race  of the 
seller.5  This implies that if  black  sellers charge  price  F,  a white  buyer 
will  perceive  the price as being  P/(l.d), where  d is  the discrimination 
coefficient.  Define  P.  to be the consumer's valuation  of the good.  The 
maximum  price  white  consumers  are willing to  pay for a unit  of the good 
purchased  from  a black  seller  is R(l-d).  White consumers  who purchase  from 
white sellers,  and black  consumers  who purchase  from any seller, are willing 
to pay up to P.  for the good.  We  assume  that consumer  demand  is inelastic 
below the price  R. 
Consumers  randomly Contact  sellers.  Imperfect  information  implies  that 
consumers  do not know (without incurring some search  Costs)  the price  of  the 
good  and the race of the seller.  If the buyer  rejects the seller's 
"price/race  quote", the Cost  of  contacting  another seller  is C dollars.  The 
optimal search  strategy  has a Constant reservation  price property  where .4- 
reservation  prices  differ  according  to both the race of the seller and the 
race of the buyer. 
Let V(P,i,j)  denote  the value of a price  offer P from  a seller  of race i 
to a consumer  of race  j  (i,j—b,w).  This value  function  is defined by: 
V(P,i,j)  — max(R-D(i,j)P, 0,  -  C  +  EV(P,i,j))  (1) 
where  D(i,j)—l/(l-d)  for i—b,  j—u, and  D(i,j)—l otherwise.  Expectations 
are taken over the distribution of  offer prices  F(P). 
A reservation  price  P*(i,j) is implicitly  defined  by: 
P.  • D(i,j)  P*(i,j) — xnax(0, 
-  C  + EV(P,i,j))  (2) 
The reservation  price  P*(i,j)  is  the price  offer  from a seller  of race i to 
a buyer  of race j  that  leaves  the buyer  indifferent between  purchasing  the 
good at that price and continuing  to search.  Since  there are four types of 
consumer/seller  matches  that can occur  in this model,  there are four 
possible  reservation  prices  (P*(w,w), p*(w,b),  P*(b,w), p*(b,bfl  for 
consumers.  We denote  the reservation  price distribution  by  G(P*).  Equation 
(2) implies  that  G(P*)  depends on  F(P). 
5.  Seller  Behavior 
Sellers  are assumed  to be  utility maximizers,  with a utility function 
given  by U — I  -  H6/6,  where  I is self-employment  income, H is hours  worked, 
and 6 > 1.  Sellers engage  in two kinds  of  activities.  First, goods  are 
produced  at rate  fi  per unit  of time, where  differs across  sellers due  to 
ability.  Second,  there is a  period  of time during  which  sellers and consumers  conduct  the transaction.  Suppose that all sellers, regardless  of 
their ability,  can complete a transactions per unit of time.  During  this 
'contact"  period  between sellers and consumers,  sellers are prevented  from 
producing  the good.  Ci  rn that consumers  randomly encounter  sellers, 
information  regarding  the price of the good and the race of the seller  is 
also exchanged  during  this contact period.  Incomplete information  implies 
that some contacts  between consumers  and sellers will not result  in a sale 
and the  time costs incurred during  the contact period  cannot be recovered. 
Thus  incomplete  information  imposes an  opportunity  cost on  sellers. 
Let r be the fraction of contacts that result  in a sale.  Sellers  offer  a 
price/race  quote  that leads to  one of  three possible  selling strategies:  (a) 
sell  to all consumers  (r — 1);  (b)  sell only to blacks  (r — 9);  and (c)  sell 
only to whites (r — 1-9).  Let s be the fraction  of  the workday spent  in 
production.  Efficiency  requires that sH  — ai(l-s)H,  hence  s  — 
The price  charged by the seller, P(r),  is a function of the segregation 
behavior  chosen:  P(r) must  be less than or equal  to the reservation  prices 
of all the consumers  it chooses  to serve.  The objective of the seller, 
therefore,  is to choose H and r so as to maximize: 
U —  P(r)H 
-  H6/6  (3) 
The maximization  of (3)  is easier  to conduct  in two stages.  First, 
consider  the seller's optimization  over H.  For a given price,  P(r),  the 
seller's  indirect utility  function  is given by: 
- (l/)[L  PC?)] 
- y/c  (4) -6- 
where c — 5/CS-I),  andy is  the income level associated  with  utility- 
maximizing  behavior.  The second  stage of  the maximization  process  involves 
the choice  of segregation  behavior by the seller.  The indirect utility 
function  in (4) can  be evaluated  at the three alternative  values  of r,  and a 
seller  chooses  the value  of  r that maximizes  utility.  The functional  form in 
(3)  implies  that utility-maximization  leads to the same segregation behavior 
as income-maximization.7  This is easily verified  since  U*(r) > U*(r')  if and 
only if  y(r) > y(r'),  for r s r'. 
As noted earlier,  sellers differ  in their ability  to produce output  (as 
measured  by the parameter  fi).  For simplicity, we assume that  there are  two 
types  of  sellers  (within each race group).  High  ability  sellers are indexed 
by the productivity  parameter h' low ability sellers  are indexed by 1  > 
fi) and  the fraction of high  ability sellers in the population  is  w.  We 
assume  the same ability distribution  for both  race  groups  so that  any income 
differentials  in the model cannot  be  attributed  to  skill  differences. 
The four types of  sellers  in  the market  generate the offer price 
distribution  F(P)  over the prices P  ,  P  ,  P  ,  and  P  ,  where  offer 
wh  wl  bh  bl 
prices  are indexed over the race and ability of  the seller.  Since sellers 
can charge  no more  than  the minimum  reservation  price  of  all the consumers 
it  chooses  to serve,  F(P) will depend on  G(P*),  the distribution  of 
reservation  prices of  consumers. 
C.  Equilibrium  Price and Income Distributions 
Because of imperfect  information,  the offer price  distribution  is likely 
to be non-degenerate.  We,  therefore, must characterize  the properties  of 
the equilibrium  price distribution  in  the market  (as in  Reinganum  1979; and 
Carlson and  McAfee  1983),  before  analyzing  income differentials  across sellers.  We  use a Nash  equilibrium  concept so that in equilibrium no seller 
has an incentive  to alter  his offer price, and no buyer  has an incentive  to 
alter his reservation  price,  taking the actions  of other agents  as given. 
We define  an  equilibriur  price distribution  as a set of  offer prices  and 
segregation  strategies  for sellers, and reservation  prices for consumers, 
such that given  F(P) consumers  choose optimal reservation  prices  P*(i,j) 
that  collectively  generate  C(P*); and given G(P*)  sellers choose  utility 
maximizing  price,  output,  and segregation  strategies  chat collectively 
generate  F(P). 
Several  important  properties  of an  equilibrium price  distribution  follow 
from  our assumptions  about  preferences  and technology  and the definition  of 
an  equilibrium: 
i.  The  price sellers charge is the minimum of the reservation prices  of 
the  consumers  they choose  to serve.  Sellers will be unable  to  sell to all 
the  consumers  they wish to  serve if they charge  a price higher than the 
minimum  reservation price; and,  given inelastic demand,  sellers have  no 
incentive  to  reduce  the price below the minimum  reservation price. 
ii.  Reservation  prices  are ordered as follows: 
P*(w,w)  P*(w,b) — p*(b,b)  p*(b,w) — (ld)P*(w,w)  (5) 
The (maximum)  price whites  are willing to pay  white sellers  [P*(w,w)}  is at 
least  as great as the price blacks  are willing  to pay white  sellers 
[p*(w,b)}:  White  buyers  set higher reservation  prices if they contact  a 
white seller  because  their potential  gains from  search  are reduced by the 
possibility  of encountering  a black seller in  their  next  contact.  Further, 
since blacks are indifferent  to  the seller's race, blacks  have a single -8- 
reservation  price  [P*(w,b) — P*(b,b)].  Third,  the price blacks  are willing 
to pay a black  seller  [P*(b,b)] is at  least as high  as the price whites  are 
willing  to pay a black  seller  (P*(b,w)].8  Finally, our definition  of 
consumer  discrimination  implies that P*(b,w) — (l-d)P*(w,w). 
iii.  If sellers serve a segregated market  it will  be of  the same racial 
group as the seller.  Equation  (5)  indicates that sellers of race I must 
charge  the same or  lower price  in  order  to attract buyers  of race j  (i  j). 
Sellers  of race i, therefore,  have no incentive to cater  solely  to  buyers of 
race j. 
iv.  High  ability  sellers of  any race  group only segregate  if  low ability 
sellers  of that  race  group have  also segregated.  This result  is implied by 
the production  technology  since the opportunity  costs  of "wasted contacts" 
(i.e.,  contacts  that  do  not result  in  a sale) are greater  the more  able the 
seller.  This behavior  implies that the offer price  distribution  can be 
ordered  as follows: 
1'wl  wh  'bi  bh 
(6) 
This ranking  follows from  the fact  that the lowest price  a white  seller  will 
ever charge  is the black  reservation  price,  and this is the highest  price 
that a black seller  can ever  charge.  Further, since within  each race group 
high ability sellers  are more likely to integrate,  they cannot  charge  a 
higher  price  than low  ability sellers if  they want to cater  to all consumers. 
In order  to assess  the impact of  consumer  discrimination  on  economic 
welfare, it is essential  to compare  the income distributions  of black  and 
white sellers.  Equation  (4)  shows that income levels will  depend  on the 
offer  price  distribution.  It is impossible to  derive a single  equilibrium -9- 
price  distribution  for all ranges of  parameter values  (afi,$h#d 
and 
C).  Nevertheless,  the model  allows us to characterize  the first  two moments  of 
the equilibrium  income distributions  regardless of the specific  price 
distribution  observed  i the market.  Equation  (4)  implies that the utility- 
maximizing  level  of income  for a seller of race i and ability level k (k—h, 
.1)  is: 
Ia1ikflk  ic  — 
L1.  +p 
(7) 
ik  k 
where tik is the segregation  strstegy chosen by the seller, and 
P(rik) 
— ik 
is the price  asaociated  with that segregation  strategy. 
It is easy to show that the mean income of black  sellers  is lower  than 
the mean income  of white  sellers.  A white seller of  ability k can always 
opt to charge  the price bk 
and retain at least as many  contacts  as a 
black seller of  ability  k.  Moreover,  equation (6) shows that even if black 
sellers  are retaining  all contacts, white  sellers can, in  general,  charge a 
higher  price  and also retain  all contacts.  Therefore,  white  sellers can 
always  do better  than  black sellers. 
Consumer  discrimination  also affects the variances  of the population 
income  distributions.  The variance  of log incomes for race group  i  (o) 
is 
given  by 1r(l-w)(y/y.))2 
where  w is the fraction of  sellers  that are high 
ability.  Note that since  the variance  of log incomes depends  on  the ratio  of 
high-  to low-ability  incomes, higher  variances are asaociated  with  higher 
returns  to ability  for that race group.  The white/black  ratio  of standard 
deviations  in log incomes  is then given by  — (/j) 
+  It can 
be shown  that,  under certain  conditions,  consumer  discrimination  leads  to the 
result A > 1,  50 that white sellers have a higher  return  to ability than -10- 
black sellers. 
Define 
-yb, as the ratio of the high ability white  seller's  income  to the 
income he would  have received had  he chosen the same segregation  strategy  as 
a low ability  white seller;  and  as the ratio of the low ability black 
seller's  income to the income he  would have received  had he chosen  the same 
segregation  strategy  as a high ability black seller.9  3y construction,  the 
"selection  biases"  and 1b are greater than  or equal  to one, since 
each seller  selected  the segregation  strategy  that maximized  indirect 
utility.  Furthermore,  1w and 
7b 
are strictly greater than  unity  if low 
ability  workers  choose  a different  segregation strategy  than  high ability 
workers  within  each race group.  The ratio  can  be written  as: 
1wi2  bhh1c 
I  •  I  (8)  b WLa7+flh 
The discussion  above  and inspection of (8)  leads to the following  result. 
PROPOSITION:  The equilibrium  income distributions  of  black and white  self- 
employed  workers  have the following properties. 
i.  Mean  white income  exceeds mean  black  income. 
ii.  If low ability whites  retain  more  Contacts  than  high  ability blacks 
(  >  r  ),  the white  income distribution has more variance 
wl  bh 
than the black income distribution.  If low ability  whites  retain  as 
many  contacts  as high  ability blacks  (rWj_rbh),  the white 
income  distribution  has more variance  than  the black income 
distribution  if,  for at  least one race  group,  there are differences 
in the segregation  behavior of high  and low ability  sellers  (i.e. 
either  7b or  exceeds unity). -1]- 
iii. If  low ability whites retain  fewer contacts  than high  ability blacks 
(r  < r  ),  the  ratio of standard deviations  is bounded  from  wl  bh 
below  by: 
>  (9) 
where  1 with a strict  inequality  if,  for at least one race 
group,  there are differences  in the segregation  behavior  of high and 
low ability sellers. 
These  results are quite  intuitive.  Suppose,  for instance, that both low 
ability whites  and high ability blacks  integrate.  Consumer discrimination 
reduces  the relative  incomes of high  ability blacks  because  they must charge 
a lower  price  in  order  to retain white  customers.  If high  ability blacks 
segregate  they must discard more contacts than white  sellers regardless  of 
the segregation  strategy  of  whites.  The opportunity  cost  of  segregation  is 
clearly highest  for high  ability blacks, and hence the black  income 
distribution  is compressed  relative  to the white  income distribution. 
Suppose,  on  the other hand,  that  <  This implies that high 
ability blacks  integrate,  but low ability whites  segregate.  High  ability 
blacks  must lower  prices in  order  to retain white  consumers.  Low ability 
whites  could have integrated  (and  charged a higher  price  than high ability 
blacks)  ,  but chose  not to because  their incomes are raised by segregating. 
In  effect,  this reduces white  income inequality, and thus the impact of 
consumer  discrimination  on the ratio of  variances  cannot be determined.  The 
lower bound  in equation  (9), however,  implies that as long as blacks  are a 
small  minority  it is unlikely  that the black  income  distribution has less -12- 
variance  than the white income distribution. 
Our result  that the returns to ability are lower  for black  sellers than 
for white  sellers has important  implications for the sorting of  individuals 
between  self-employment  and other sectors of the labor market.1°  In 
particular,  able blacks  have less incentive to be self-employed  than 
able  whites.  Consumer  discrimination  and incomplete  information,  therefore, 
have an impact  not only  on  the relative size of  the black self-employment 
sector,  but also on the composition of  sellers in that sector.11  Moreover, 
this  prediction  of the impact of  consumer discrimination  does not follow 
from a simpler  complete  information model. 
Zero  search  costs  imply that buyers  and sellers  are sorted perfectly  by 
race and that a single price will  prevail in  the market.  Since consumers 
can costlessly  identify  the price of  the good  and the race of  the seller in 
all firms,  there  are no "wasted contacts".  Equation  (7)  implies that the 
income of a seller of race i and ability k is given by: 
— k ]  (10) 
where  P is the market  price.  Using equation  (10),  it is easy  to verify  that 
the ratio  of standard deviations  of  white to black incomes, , is  unity. 
Consumer  discrimination  in a complete information model,  therefore,  does not 
lead to racial  differences  in  the returns to ability.12 
D.  Employer  Discrimination 
Our analysis  of consumer  discrimination  in  the self-employment  sector 
shows  that  the population  income distribution  for blacks will  be more 
compressed  than the population  income distribution  for whites.  These -13- 
population incoee distributions  are the ones that would  be observed  if every 
person  in the labor market  became  self-employed.  The choice of  self- 
employment,  however, is endogenous  and is based  on a comparison  of income 
opportunities  in  the self-employed  and salaried sectors.  The actual 
composition  of  persons  in the self-employed  pooi,  therefore,  will also  depend 
on  the characteristics  of the salaried  income distribution.  Hence  it is 
necessary  to determine whether  employer discrimination  in  salaried jobs leads 
to the same types of income compression as consumer discrimination  in self- 
13 
employed  jobs. 
Suppose  that within  each race group there are two types of workers,  high- 
and low-ability,  with  wage rates  rib and r1 (i—b,w), and that labor  can be 
-  .  .  14  -  - 
measured  in efficiency units,  fi,  such  that h 
> .R•  Competition  in  the 
labor  market  requires that for each  racial group  the price of an efficiency 
unit of labor  (r/$) be the same for all skill groups.  This implies  that 
r.h/r. 
—  (i.-b,w).  It  follows  immediately  that the black/white  wage 
ratio  is independent of  skill  level.  Labor market  competition,  therefore, 
ensures  that  employer discrimination  does not lead to any compression  or 
widening  of skill differentials  within  each race group.15 
It  has been  argued  that  affirmative action  raises  the demand  for black 
skilled  workers relative  to  other blacks  (Leonard,  1984).  There  is,  however, 
little  economic reason  for this to  occur.  Suppose,  for example,  that a law 
mandates  that 8 percent blacks  be hired  at the same wage as whites.  A profit- 
maximizing  firm  will  meet this requirement by hiring  the cheapest possible 
black labor available,  namely  low-skilled black  workers.  This result  follows 
from  the fact  that affirmative  action  programs are specified  in terms  of the 
relative  number  of  blacks  hired,  and  not in terms of efficiency  units.  Hence 
the simplest model  of employer  discrimination  suggests  that, if  anything, -14- 
there may be an  increase  in  the relative  demand of  unskilled black  workers. 
In  summary,  consumer  discrimination  reduces  the returns to ability for 
blacks (relative  to whites)  in the self-employment  sector.  Employer 
discrimination  (in the absence of  affirmative  action) does not change  the 
relative  returns to  ability  for blacks  in the salaried  sector.  These 
theoretical  implications,  therefore,  suggest that the skill composition  of 
self-employed  and salaried  workers will  differ  by  race.  In  psrticular, 
skilled  blacks  have  more incentives  to enter  the salaried sector than 
skilled  whites,  and unskilled  blacks  have more  incentives  to enter  self- 
employment  than  unskilled  whites.  Therefore,  blacks  are more likely than 
whites  to be negatively  selected  into self-employment  and positively 
selected  into salaried jobs. 
III.  Empirical  Analysis 
A.  Framework 
Individuals  compare  income  streams between  the salaried sector, w0, and 
the self-employment  sector, w1J6 These income streams depend  on a vector 
of observed  demographic  variables,  X: 
in  w0 
— 
Xfl0  +  (11) 
in  w1 
—  +  (12) 
where the random  variables  and  are jointly  normally distributed, 
have mean  zero,  variances  and  c, and correlation  coefficient  p01. 
The unobserved  characteristics,  c, correspond  to the efficiency  differences 
fi  in the theoretical  model  above. 
For simplicity,  we assume  that  all individuals  start  their careers  in  the -15- 
salaried  sector,  and that transition  to  the self-employment  sector  involves 
a cost.  These  mobility  costs are proxied by a vector  of observable 
variables.  Define  C to be the ratio of  these mobility  costs to 
u0. Then: 
C—Xfl +c  (13)  cc  c 






The  self-employment  decision  is determined  by the sign  of  the index 
function: 
i — In 
[W0t+C)] 
x(fi1-0) 
-  Xfl  + v — Z + v  (la) 
where  v —  -  -  .  The  vector  Z contains all the variables  in X  and  X 
1  0  c  c 
and the coefficient  vector  ir gives the reduced form  impact  of  the 
demographic  variables  on the propensity  to  become  self-employed. 
The composition  of the samples  in the self-employed  and salaried  sectors 
can be determined  by considering: 
E(ln  w0X,I<O) 
—  + 00l 
-  -  0c  Ao  (15) 
E(ln  w1JX,I>O) 
—  + —-—  - 
p01) 
-  lc  i.  (16) 
where  — -(z)/(z);  A1 
— (z)/(l-(z)); z — z1t/v;  is the density 
function  of the standard normal,  and  is the distribution  function of the -16- 
standard  normal 
The  implications  of the model are best  understood  in  the special case 
where Oc 
— lc 
— 0.  As long  ss p01 is positive  (i.e., able  persons  do well 
in both self-employed  and salaried jobs) 
,  positive  selection  into self- 
employment  occurs if °l°0 
> 
p01,  and negative  selection  occurs  otherwise. 
Therefore,  when  the income distribution  is compressed  in  the self-employment 
sector  relative  to the salaried  sector, it is likely  that the most able 
persons  stay in the salaried  sector, and that low ability persons  (in terms 
of c)  become  self-employed. 
In the more general case  where  the costs  of entering  the self-employment 
sector  and earnings are correlated,  the coefficients  of the selection 
variable  in (15)  and (16) also  depend on the correlation  coefficients 0c  and 
plc' 
and on  the variance 02. Though  little is known  about these parameters, 
negative  selection  into self-employment  is still more likely  among blacks 
than among whites  as long as the black income distribution  in  the self- 
employment  sector has less variance  than  the white  income distribution. 
B.  Data 
The empirical  analysis  uses individual data from  the 1/100 B Sample of 
the 1980  U.S.  Census of Population.  In order  to  focus  on  self-employment  in 
the non-agricultural  sector, our data  consist  of  observations  of  white, 
black,  Asian,  and Hispanic  men (aged 25-64), residing  in  metropolitan  areas, 
who are not employed  in  the agricultural industry.  The data include all 
observations  in  the 1/100 random  sample for individuals who are minority  and 
self-employed,  and random  samples for other  groups.17  We  use the Census 
definition  of a self-employed  person  as one whose  main  job is in  that 
sector.  There  are other ways  of defining  self-employment,  and  our use of -17- 
alternative  definitions  of  self-employment  did not lead  to  different 
results.  Finally,  the income measure used throughout  the study is the 
logarithm  of weekly  income in  1979. 
Table 1 presents  sumary statistics for these data,  and shows  that self- 
employment  rates  differ substantially  across racial  and ethnic groups. 
White  males are nearly  three  times as likely  as black  males to be  self- 
employed.  Hispanic  men are also much  less likely  to be  self-employed  than 
whites,  while  Asians  have self-employment  rates  that  are nearly  identical  to 
whites.  Mean self-employment  incomes, like salaried  incomes, display 
considerable  variation  across groups.  For instance,  blacks earn  about  38 
percent  less than  whites  in the salaried sector, and about 47 percent  less 
than  whites  in the self-employment  Sector.  Hispanics  earn  about 38 percent 
less than  whites  in the salaried sector, and about  28 percent less in the 
self-employment  sector.  Thus, among blacks and  Hispanics,  the income  gap 
between  minorities  and whites  in self-employment  incomes  is nearly  as large 
(if not larger)  than the gap in  the salaried sector. 
Table  2 presents  the means of  some demographic  variables  for self- 
employed  and salaried workers.  Self-employed persons  are significantly  more 
likely  to be college  educated than salaried persons.  For instance, 38 
percent of  self-employed  whites  are college educated,  but only  29 percent  of 
salaried  whites  are.  Even among blacks, 19 percent  of se1f-empoyed persons 
are college  educated, while  only 12 percent  of  salaried blacks  are.  Table 2 
also indicates  a large age differential between  workers  in the two sectors: 
Self-employed  workers  are about  3  to 5 years  older  than salaried  workers. 
Finally,  self-employed  workers  are more likely to be  married with  a spouse 
present in  the household  than salaried workers.  Among  whites, for example, 
81 percent of self-employed persons are married,  spouse present, but only 75 -18- 
percent of salaried  persons are.  Among blacks,  the respective  Statistics 
are 68 and 61  percent. 
C.  Results 
Table  3 presents  the probit  regressions  on the determinants  of the self- 
employment  probability  for each  of the groups.  These regressions estimate 
the parameters  of the reduced  form  index function  in  equation (14).  Like 
the descriptive  statistics  in Table 2,  the regressions  indicate that more 
educated  and older persons are more likely  to be  self-employed.  In 
addition,  higher  education  levels  for the wife increase the probability  of 
self-employment.  In  general,  the qualitative  effects of  these explanatory 
variables  are essentially  the same for all the groups. 
The probit  regressions  in  Table  3 also include measures of the 
ethnic/racial  composition of the labor market's population.  These variables 
are defined  by the fraction  of the SMSA's  population  that  is black, 
Hispanic,  or  Asian.  In general,  these  "enclave" variables  have a weak 
impact  on  self-employment  propensities.  The only "own" effect that is even 
marginally  significant is the positive  impact of  percent black  on the black 
self-employment  rate.  The regressions  also include a number of other local 
labor market  characteristics  (e.g.,  the crime race, population  growth, 
etc.).  These  variables  proxy  for labor market  specific differences  in  the 
costs of becoming  self-employed.  In  general,  the coefficients  of  these 
variables  differ in  terms of statistical  significance as well as sign  across 
the ethnic/racial  groups.  To conserve  space,  therefore,  the coefficients  of 
these  additional  local labor  market  variables  are not presented  in  Table  3. 
The white  probit regression  can be used to predict what  the average 
self-employment  rate of the various  minority  groups would be if  the same -19- 
mechanism  that  determined  self-employment  rates for  whites  generated 
minority  self-employment  rates.  This predicted probability  is presented  in 
the last row of  Table  3 and is calculated using:18 
P — Z (Zi)/N  (17) 
where Z  is the vector  of  variables  (for individual  i)  included  in  the 
probit;  is the vector  of probit coefficients  estimated  in the white 
sample;  and N is the sample  size.  The summation  in (17) is conducted  over 
all persons  in the particular  ethnic/racial group. 
The predicted  probabilities  show  that the self-employment  rates  of 
blacks  and Hispanics  would  be almost identical to those of  whites if the 
minority  groups  faced  the same structure determining  self-employment,  while 
the self-employment  rate of Asians would exceed  that of  whites.  For 
example,  the average  black  has a predicted self-employment  rate  of 10.5 
percent (as compared  to the actual 4.5 percent self-employment  rate);  and 
the average Hispanic  has a predicted  rate of 12.0 percent  (as compared  to 
the actual 7.0 percent  self-employment  rate).  P,oth blacks and Hispanics, 
therefore,  would  have self-employment  rates remarkably  close  to the 11.8 
percent  self-employment  rate  of  whites  if the groups  faced  the same 
Structure.  This implies  that differences  in characteristics  across groups 
cannot  explain  the large variation  in observed self-employment  rates. 
Instead  the observed  variation  in self-employment  rates  is due to 
differences  in the mechanism  that selects the self-employment  pool in each 
of  the race/ethnic  groups. 
The probit  regressions  in  Table 3 are used to estimate  selectivity 
corrected  earnings  functions  in each of  the two sectors for each  of the -20- 
groups.19  The earnings  regressions  are presented  in Table  4 for the self- 
employed  sector,  and in  Table  5 for the salaried sector.  Before  turning to 
the selectivity  variables,  it is instructive  to briefly  analyze  the impact 
of the demographic  variables  on  incomes in  each sector.  One striking  result 
is that the impact of  the demographic variables  is basically  the same for 
self-employment  and salaried  incomes for all race groups.  There are, of 
course,  differences  in the magnitudes of  the coefficients  by race and by 
sector, but the overall  comparisons  of the earnings equations  do  not support 
the hypothesis  that earnings  determination in  the two sectors  is 
qualitatively  different.20 
Of course,  the main focus of  the study is the determination  of  the kinds 
of selections  that generate the pools of  self-employed  and salaried  workers. 
The type  of selection  is determined by the sign  of the coefficients  of the 
selectivity  variables.  One key result in Table 4 is that the coefficient of 
the selectivity  variable  in the self-employment  income  regression  is 
positive  for whites, but zero  or  negative for all minority  groups.  Since, 
as defined  in equation  (16), the selectivity variable  in the self-employment 
sector  (A1) 
is positive,  this result  implies that there  is  positive 
selection  into self-employment  in the white  aample, negative  selection  into 
self-employment  among  Hispanics  and Asians, and zero selection  into self- 
employment  among  blacks. 
The same dramatic  differences  in the selectivity  coefficients  are 
observed  in  the regressions  estimated in  the salaried  sample  (Table  5).  In 
particular,  this  coefficient  is positive for whitea  but negative  and 
significant  for all minority  groups.  Since the selectivity  variable  (A0) 
is negative  in the salaried  sector, the coefficients  imply that there is 
negative  selection  in  the composition of  the salaried  sample  for whites,  but -21- 
that  there  is positive  selection  generating  the salaried samples of 
minorities. 
Among  whites,  therefore, we  observe that  the most  able persons enter  self- 
employment,  and that the least skilled persons remain  in the salaried  sector. 
Among the various  minority  groups, however, essentially  the opposite  result 
is observed:  the most  able persons remain  in the salaried  sector, and the 
least skilled  become  self-employed.  It is important  to note that this 
empirical  result  is exactly what is predicted  by our theoretical  model.  In 
particular,  the existence  of  consumer discrimination  reduces the gains  from 
self-employment  for the most able members of a minority  group. 
Remarkably,  these findings persist even  when the self-employment  and 
salaried  sectors  are stratified into two major  occupation  groups: 
professionals  and others.21  Table 6 presents  the coefficients  of  the 
selectivity  variables  in  each of the two sectors  by  occupation  group.  White 
self-employed  persons  are positively  selected regardless  of  occupation, 
while  minority  self-employed  workers are never  positively  selected,  and are 
often negatively  selected.  Conversely,  white  salaried persons are not 
positively  selected,  while minority  salaried persons  are always positively 
selected. 
Our theoretical  model  is based on the premise  that personal  contacts 
between  consumers  and sellers are essential  for the presence  of consumer 
discrimination.  To the extent  that the degree  of  personal contact  differs by 
occupation  group,  it  seems reasonable  to expect  that the intensity  of 
selection  would differ by occupation.  However,  it is unclear a  priori  which 
occupation  group has more contact with their consumers:  Do  accountants  and 
lawyers  have  more personal contact with  their  clients than  salesmen  and 
plumbers?  Moreover,  disaggregating  the sample  into two broadly  defined -22- 
occupations  may not be  aufficient  to capture the subtle variations  in 
selection  that arise as the degree of  personal  contact varies. 
Unfortunately,  any further disaggregation  leads to increasingly smaller 
samples  and to less robust  estimation of the parameters. 
The selectivity  results presented  in this section arise because  the 
variance  in  self-employment  incomes  (relative to the variance  in salaried 
incomes)  is reduced  for minorities  due to consumer discrimination.  This 
implication  of the model  can be tested directly  by calculating  the standard 
deviation  of the population  income diatributiona  in each  of the two sectors. 
Table  7 presents  estimates  of the standard deviationa  of  log incomes in the 
two sectors  by  race.  The predicted population  standard  deviation  (i.e. ,  the 
variation  that  would  arise  if all individuals  entered the sector after 
controlling  for differences  in  demographic variables)  is calculated  using the 
formula  suggested  by Heckman  (1980, p. 217).  Table  7 also presents  the 
(square root  of the) truncated mean square error from  the selectivity- 
corrected  OLS earnings regressions. 
A key prediction  of  our model  is that there will  be less income 
inequality  among  self-employed  minorities  than  among  self-employed  whirea. 
Table 7  indicates  that the population  standard deviations  of self-employment 
income  are indeed  lower  among blacks  and Hispanics  than  among whites. 
Selection,  however,  is determined  by the ratio of  population  standard 
deviations  between  the selZ-employment  and the salaried  sectors.  The 
results  in Table 7  reveal  that the ratio of  the standard  deviation  of self- 
employment  incomes  to salaried  incomes is always  greater for whites  than  for 
minority  groups  (particularly blacks  and Hispanics).  For example,  the 
predicted  population  standard  deviation ratio  for whites  is 2.4, but only 
1.3 for blacks  and Hispanics. -23- 
These ratios differ  by race,  in  part, because in  the salaried  sector  the 
minority  income  distributions  exhibit more dispersion  than the white  income 
distribution.  We do not know why this result arises  since  there has been 
little  study  of racial  differences  in the  second moment  of wage 
distributions.22  Nevertheless,  it is important to note that this result  is 
not simply  generated  by the algebra underlying  the construction  of  the 
population  standard  deviation  because it is also  found  in  the simpler MSE- 
based  measure  of income  inequality  (which is based  on the residuals  of the 
OLS regression) 
The results  in Table 7,  therefore,  are consistent  with  the selection 
patterns  indicated  by the earnings  functions in  Tables  4 and 5.  Although  the 
measures  of income inequality  in Table  7  are generated  from  the same earnings 
functions  as the selectivity  coefficients, the sorting patterns  observed  in 
the data  are not derived  from  our estimates of the population  variances. 
There is nothing  in the statistical  procedure  that forces the pattern of 
selectivity  coefficients  and population  variances  to be consistent  with  each 
other. 
Finally,  we  use  the earnings  functions in Tables  4 and 5 to decompose  the 
observed  wage differential  between whites and the various minority  groups  in 
each  of the two sectors.  This decomposition, presented  in  Table  8,  is 
conducted  by setting  the selectivity  variables  equal  to zero so that, 
in  effect,  we are comparing  means  of  population  income distributions.  The 
results  for blacks  and Hispanics  reveal that even after controlling  for 
differences  in demographic  characteristics  the income  gap between  minorities 
and whites  remains.  Self-employed  blacks, for example,  have 19 percent  lower 
mean incomes  than  whites.  This result  is consistent  with the implication  of 
our theoretical  model.  The theoretical  prediction  that self-employed -24- 
minorities have lower  incomes than  whites, however,  is not confirmed  by  the 
analysis  of  the Asian  data, since  in this case  Asians  actually  earn  more than 
whites,  on  average. 
IV.  Summary 
This  paper  presents  a theoretical and empirical  analysis  of  racial 
differences  in  self-employment  propensities and incomes.  The theoretical 
model  is based  on  the hypothesis  that white consumers  dislike purchasing 
goods from  self-employed  minority workers, and that it is costly  to acquire 
information  about  the price offers  and racial characteristics  of sellers. 
Our equilibrium  search model  not only implies the existence  of  price 
dispersion  in  the marketplace,  but also yields  two interesting  predictions. 
First, minority  self-employed  workers have lower incomes  than  white  self- 
employed workers.  Second,  the income distribution  of  self-  employed minority 
workers  has less variance  than  the income distribution  of  self-employed 
whites.  The latter  result  implies that the gsins  to self-  employment  for 
able minorities  are relatively  smaller than the gains  to self- employment  for 
able whites.  Therefore,  able minorities have  much lower  incentives  to become 
self-employed  and minorities  are more likely than  whites  to be  negatively 
selected  into self-employment. 
The empirical  analysis  used the 1980 U.S. Census  and showed  large 
differences  in both  self-employment  rates and incomes across  the 
ethnic/racial  groups.  The self-employment  rates  of blacks  and Hispanics,  for 
example,  were found  to be at  least 50  percent lower  than  those  of  whites, and 
the earnings  differential  between  self-employed whites  and  blacks (or 
Hispanics)  was almost  as large  (if not larger  than)  the racial wage -25- 
differential  in the salaried sector.  In addition,  our analysis revealed  that 
minorities  are negatively  selected into self-employment  while whites  exhibit 
positive  selection,  Conversely,  whites are negatively  selected  into salaried 
jobs,  while  the most  able minorities  remain in  the salaried sector.  The 
theory  of consumer  discrimination,  therefore,  provides  unique  insights  into 
the composition  of  the pool  of  workers who self-select  between the two 
employment  sectors. —26— 
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fact,  if employers  are the only source  of racial discrimination  in 
the marketplace, one would expect  that  self-employment  rates  for minorities 
would be higher since these groups would find it less profitable  to be in 
salaried  jobs. 
2For example, if we assume that white and black consumers  are "perfect 
substitutes" in the marketplace  (i.e.  ,  they have equal incomes an dentical 
preferences)  the black self-employment  Sector  would be a mirror image  of the 
white self-employment  sector,  though  on a smaller scale. 
3Blau (1985)  examines the choice  between self-employment  and salaried 
jobs in a self-selection  model  where individuals  differ in their  managerial 
ability.  His model, however, does  not generate  predictions  about the types 
of selection  that are expected to  arise. 
4The assumption that he percent  black among consumers equals  the 
percent black among sellers is not necessary  for the theoretical  analysis. 
It only simplifies  the notation and the presentation. 
5The  model can be generalized  by allowing  black buyers to discriminate 
against white sellers.  This extension  complicates the presentation  of the 
analysis,  without fundamentally  changing  the nature of the results.  This 
generalization  will be discussed  in more detail  below. -29- 
6lnvoking the Law of  Large Numbers,  we assume that sellers making n 
contacts with consumers  contact exactly Gn blacks and (l-9)n  whites. 
Allowing the number  of consumers  of each race group to be a random  vatiable 
to the firm does not alter  the important  results of our model, but simply 
generates variation in income  and output  across  firms  of the same race and 
ability level.  In  addition,  we focus  on a  "steady  state"  equilibrium  of the 
model, where the number  of consumers leaving  the market in each period  just 
equals the number  of new consumers  entering the market.  For simplicity,  we 
also assume that each consumer  who is searching  makes  exactly one contact in 
the period. 
7Thjs property follows from the assumption  that utility  is additively 
separable in income  and leisure (Scitovsky  1943) 
8Note that the ordering in equation (5) implies that there can be at 
most three prices in the equilibrium  distribution.  The  fact that black and 
white sellers may charge the  same  price implies that  price alone is not a 
perfect signal for  the race of the seller. 
9The precise definitions  of -y  and  are given  by: 
r  wh1  1whh)  wh1  — 
lw1flh)Tw1hPw2J 
r'  b21  — 
L((mrbh)/(arbh+j))P(rbh)i 
10Although the proposition  has been derived under the assumption that 
contacts are random,  and that  each sellers  probability  of encountering a 
consumer of race j equals the population  proportion  of consumers of race j, -30- 
we can generalize our results to allow  for  racial  "ghettos".  The existence 
of racial ghettos implies  that although  contacts between buyers and sellers 
are random, sellers encounter  a larger fraction  of consumers  of their  same 
race than the overall population  proportions.  It is easy to show that the 
proposition still  holds given the alternative  values of  r which result  from 
racial ghettos, although "ghettoization"  does increase  the  incentives  for 
both whites and blacks to segregate. 
11Throughout this section,  we have used a very simple form of consumer 
discrimination  by ignoring  the possibility  that  black consumers  prefer to 
purchase from black sellers.  It can  be shown that the key result  that the 
black income  distribution (under  certain  conditions)  is more compressed  than 
the white income  distribution  holds even in the general case where  both types 
of consumers have a taste  for discrimination. The ranking of black and white 
mean incomes, however, depends on the relative  strengths of discrimination  by 
the two types of consumers  and on the percent black in the marketplace. 
12 The discussion  implicitly  assumes  that white and black buyers are 
"perfect substitutes" in terms  of their  demands for the good.  Suppose 
instead that black buyers  have less income  and therefore  a lower demand for 
the good.  High ability black sellers may not be able to attain their  optimal 
level of output by catering to only blacks,  and will have to lower their 
price to P(l-d) in order  attract  white  buyers.  Competition  among  black 
sellers reduces the price in all black firms to P(ld).  This leads  to lower 
black self-employment  incomes,  but it is easy to show that , the  ratio of 
standard deviations of white and black  incomes, is still  unity. 
13See Goldberg (1981) for a  modern  treatment  of the Becker model of 
employer discrimination. 
efficiency  units we mean that one unit of high ability labor is a perfect substitute for h1  units of low ability labor. 
15An extension of Reinganum's (1979) search  model to the case of 
employer discrimination under incomplete  information  reveals  that,  under some 
conditions, wage skill differentials  remain independent  of race.  The returns 
to ability for blacks, however, may be reduced  in more general formulations 
of the model that allow for differential  search costs  by ability level. 
16The self-selection  model presented  in this section is due to Roy 
(1951) 
170ur sample consists  of 3.3% of white salaried  workers; 33% of white 
self-employed workers, and black and Hispanic salaried workers;  all Asian 
salaried workers, and all black, Hispanic,  and Asian self-employed  workers in 
the 1980 Census data.  Due  to the stratified  sampling technique,  the probit 
regressions reported  below are weighted (and their standard  errors  corrected) 
to reflect the sample  composition.  Finally,  itt  order to match the individual 
data with SMSA-specific characteristics  we restrict the sample  to persons 
residing in the 75 largest SSAs.  The source  of these  SMSA-specific  and 
local labor market variables is the U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1986). 
18This formula ensures that the predicted  probability  in the white 
sample is identical to the observed self-employment  rate of  whites.  See 
Madd,ala  (1983,  p. 26). 
19The aggregate labor market  characteristics  listed  in the notes to 
Table 3, which proxy for mobility costs,  are omitted from the earnings 
functions. 
20Tables 4 and 5 can also be used to assess the impact  of 'enclave' 
effects on earnings.  The comparison  of the relevant coefficients  across the 
two sets of regressions,  however, does not provide any evidence that enclave 
effects have a differential  impact  on self-employment  and salaried incomes. -32- 
21The professional category includes  all persons working in managerial 
and professional specialty occupations  according  to the 1980 Census 
occupation codes.  All other workers  are  in the residual  category which 
includes sales, service, craftsmen,  operators,  and laborers.  The fraction of 
salaried workers who are in the professional  occupation  group is 31.2% for 
whites,  14.2% for blacks, 14.0%  for Hispanics,  and 34.3%  for Asians.  The 
fraction of self-employed  workers who are  in the professional occupation 
group ia 46.7% for whites, 29.6%  for blacks, 34.1%  for Hispanics, and 52.4% 
for Asians. 
22smith and Welch (1979) present an analysis  of income inequality  by 
race, and also find  that the black income  distribution  in the salaried  sector 
exhibits substantially  more dispersion  than the white income  distribution. TABLE  1 
Sununary  Statistics 
In (Weekly Earnings) 
Self-  Employment  Self-Employment  Salaried 
Probability  Sector  Sector 
Whites  .118  5.842  5.849 
Blacks  .045  5.371  5.466 
Hispanics  .070  5.558  5.465 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE  6 
Selectivity Coefficients  by Occupation* 
Professional  ___________ 
Self-Enwloved  Salaried  Se].f-Emoloyed  Salaried 
Whites  .856  .156  1.549  1.032 
(2.28)  (.45)  (4.17)  (3.01) 
Blacks 
- .407  -1.886  .202  -1.440 
(- .71)  (-2.68)  (.38)  (-2.34) 
Hispanics 
- .699  -2.148  .218  - .993 
(-1.91)  (-4.74)  (.68)  (-3.01) 
Asians  -1.336  -1.347  -1.014  - .331 
(-1.86)  (-4.30)  (-1.37)  (-1.01) 
*The t-ratios  are presented  in  parentheses. TABLE 7 
Estimated Standard Deviations of (in)  Weekly Incomes 
Truncated c  -  - 
Self-  Self- 
Employed  Salaried  KB.jQ  Ersoloved  Salaried 
Whites  1.27  .65  1.95  1.63  .69  2.36 
Blacks  1.35  .81  1.68  1.35  1.07  1.26 
Hispanic  1.14  .75  1.52  1.46  1.15  1.27 
Asian  1.31  .69  1.89  1.78  .88  2.03 TABLE  8 
Decomposition  of Racial  Wae  Differentials 
Self-Emlovment Sector  Salaried  Sector 
Actual Wage  Predicted  Actual Wage  Predicted 
Differential  Differential  Differential  Differential 
Between  if  Minority  Between  If Minority 
Whites  and  Group  Faced  Whites  and  Group  Faced 
Minority  White  Minority  White 
Grous  Structure  Groups  Structure 
Blacks  .469  .194  .385  116 
Hispanics  .276  .048  .394  .176 
Asians  .053 
- .270  .209  .067 